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I. Executive Summary
1 The present submission provides an overview of the rules of international law governing the 
conduct of lethal drone operations by British armed forces.1 In particular, it provides an assessment of 
the key legal aspects of the drone strike carried out by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in Raqqa, Syria, on 
21 August 2015, as this strike is of particular interest to the present inquiry. Our key conclusions 
regarding the Raqqa strike are as follows.
 Although the Government has relied on legal arguments which are not entirely settled, a strong 
prima facie case has been made to justify the strike as a lawful exercise of the right of self-
defence.
 The law of armed conflict relating to non-international armed conflict applied to the strike and 
in this light the operation was conducted in full conformity with the relevant rules. 
 The European Convention on Human Rights did not apply to the strike in Raqqa. Even if it did, 
the better view is that the authority for lethal targeting under the law of armed conflict, 
including the permissibility of causing incidental civilian loss not in excess of the military 
advantage anticipated (had this rule been applicable in present case), operates to displace a 
stringent interpretation of Article 2 ECHR.
 Overall, it appears that the concerns that the Government’s legal argument is inconsistent, 
inadequate or a radically new departure are misplaced. 
II. The Applicable International Legal Framework
2 Over the last decade, the use of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), colloquially known as 
‘drones’, has proliferated. Their extended loitering capability has proven itself particularly useful in a 
counter-insurgency role, prompting many States, including the UK, to invest in this new technology.2 
The emergence of drone warfare has raised a series of difficult questions under public international law. 
Despite extensive public and scholarly debate, many of these questions remain unresolved. This is so 
largely because the applicable law is uncertain and complex. This uncertainty and complexity does not 
absolve States from their duty to comply with their international obligations in good faith. However, it 
does mean that there is scope for reasonable disagreement as to what those obligations are and how the 
tensions between the different applicable legal regimes should be reconciled.
3 A broad consensus exists that the conduct of drone strikes in principle engages three main 
branches of international law: the rules governing the use of force, the law of armed conflict and 
international human rights law.3 Consequently, the principal elements of the international legal 
framework governing drone operations are perfectly clear. What is less clear, and hence subject to 
debate, is the mutual relationship of these three branches, the conditions governing their applicability, 
the constraints they impose on military action and the legal authority they confer on States to conduct 
1 We do not use the term ‘targeted killing’ in this submission, primarily because ‘[i]n a situation qualifying as 
an armed conflict, the adoption of a pre-identified list of individual military targets is not unlawful’, but 
constitutes ‘a paradigm application of the principle of distinction’, as pointed out by Ben Emmerson QC in 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UN Doc A/68/389, 18 September 2013, para 24.
2 See Louisa Brooke-Holland, Overview of Military Drones Used by the UK Armed Forces, House of 
Commons Library, Briefing Paper, Number 6493, 8 October 2015. 
3 Michael N Schmitt, ‘Narrowing the International Law Divide: The Drone Debate Matures’, (2014) 39 Yale 
Journal of International Law 12, 14. 
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lethal operations. These legal difficulties are neither novel nor uniquely confined to drone warfare. For 
the most part, the use of drones simply adds fuel to existing legal controversies.4 These controversies 
have been covered in great detail elsewhere.5 In this submission, we concentrate on the main points of 
contention relevant to the present inquiry, in particular in relation to the drone strike carried out by the 
Royal Air Force (RAF) in Raqqa, Syria, on 21 August 2015.6
III. The Rules Governing the Use of Force
4 International law prohibits States from using force in the conduct of their international relations.7 
The prohibition is a comprehensive one and there is little doubt that the use of armed drones to conduct 
lethal strikes in the territory of other States engages it. This is so even in cases where a drone strike is 
directed against third parties present in the territory of another State, rather than the infrastructure or 
personnel of the host State itself.8
5 The prohibition of the use of force is subject to certain exceptions. If a drone strike falls within one 
or more of these, it will not constitute an unlawful use of force.9 Three exceptions are relevant in the 
present context.10 First, the territorial State may consent to drone operations within its territory. The 
consent of the Afghan authorities thus constituted one of the legal bases for the deployment of RAF 
drones as part of Operation Herrick in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2014. Second, the deployment of 
drones may be permissible in the implementation of an enforcement mandate issued by the Security 
Council of the United Nations acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Provided that 
the Security Council has authorised the use of ‘all necessary measures’, the conduct of lethal drone 
operations is permissible within the scope of the mandate. In a written answer to the House of Lords, 
Lord Astor of Hever, Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence, acknowledged that ‘UK 
personnel flew armed remotely piloted air systems missions against Gaddafi’s forces in Libya in 2011, 
in support of the NATO humanitarian mission authorised under UNSCR resolution 1973’.11 Third, 
drone operations may be permissible in the exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective 
self-defence.12 The Government has relied on this third exception to justify the operation carried out in 
Raqqa on 21 August 2015. In its letter addressed to the Security Council on 7 September 2015, the 
Government stated that the strike was carried out against a ‘target known to be actively engaged in 
planning and directing imminent armed attacks against the United Kingdom’ and that the use of force 
constituted a ‘necessary and proportionate exercise of the individual right of self-defence of the United 
4 As acknowledged in JDN 2/11, The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Development, Concepts 
and Doctrine Centre, 30 March 2011, 5–1 (‘Most of the legal issues surrounding the use of existing and 
planned systems are well understood and are simply a variation of those associated with manned systems.’)
5 E.g. Michael N Schmitt, ‘Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of International Law’, 
(2013) 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 77; Jelena Pejic, ‘Extraterritorial Targeting by Means of 
Armed Drones: Some Legal Implications’ (2014) 96 International Review of the Red Cross 67.
6 For an overview, see Arabella Lang, UK Drone Attack in Syria: Legal Questions, House of Commons 
Library Briefing Paper, Number 7332, 20 October 2015.
7 Article 2(4), United Nations Charter. See also Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA), (Merits) (1986) ICJ Rep 14, paras 187–192.
8 Whether the mere transit of an armed drone without the consent of the territorial State constitutes a use of 
force is open to question, but this issue does not need to be settled here. See Olivier Corten, The Law Against 
War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law (2010), at 84–92.
9 Although this would not necessarily prevent it from violating other applicable rules of international law, for 
instance the law of armed conflict.
10 In addition to the exceptions discussed here, it should be recalled that the UK Government takes the position 
that the use of force is also permitted in order to alleviate an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. See 
Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government Legal Position, 29 August 2013 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-
legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version). 
However, so far this doctrine has not been invoked to justify individual drone strikes.
11 Hansard, House of Lords, 24 July 2012, col WA140.
12 Article 51, United Nations Charter.
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Kingdom’.13 In addition, the letter also stated that ‘ISIL is engaged in an ongoing armed attack against 
Iraq, and therefore action against ISIL in Syria is lawful in the collective self-defence of Iraq.’ Despite 
suggestions to the contrary, there is no logical or legal contradiction between invoking the right of 
individual and collective self-defence at the same time. An armed attack may be directed against a State 
and its allies simultaneously. Indeed, it should be recalled that the UK has relied on the right of both 
individual and collective self-defence in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001.14 
6 As far as individual self-defence is concerned, it is clear from the letter addressed to the Security 
Council that the Government invoked the right of self-defence against an attack from ISIL which had 
not yet materialised. This raises a number of questions. First, to be lawful, military action in self-
defence must be directed against an armed attack. In his statement made to the House of Commons on 7 
September 2015, Prime Minister David Cameron declared that the ISIL fighters targeted by the Raqqa 
strike were ‘seeking to orchestrate specific and barbaric attacks against the West, including directing a 
number of planned terrorist attacks right here in Britain, such as plots to attack high profile public 
commemorations, including those taking place this summer.’15 The statement makes clear that, if 
successful, the attacks would have caused loss of life and damage to property in the UK.16 As such, they 
would have risen to the level of an armed attack in their scale and effects,17 thereby satisfying any 
gravity requirement for lawful self-defence. In recent years, a debate has ensued at to whether self-
defence is available only if an armed attack emanates from another State or whether it is also available 
against non-State actors not acting under the control or the directions of another State. While the 
International Court of Justice insists that the right of self-defence is limited to cases of ‘armed attack by 
one State against another State’,18 this approach has been rejected as too restrictive.19 In fact, it does not 
reflect State practice.20 The better view is that the right of individual and collective self-defence does 
extend to attacks originating from non-State actors, such as ISIL.21
7 Second, it has been questioned whether military action by the UK in anticipation of an attack 
which has not yet materialised was justified. The permissibility and conditions governing anticipatory 
self-defence have been the subject of a long-running debate. It is now broadly accepted that the right of 
self-defence cannot be so strictly construed as to condemn a victim State to await a debilitating blow,22 
yet it is not authoritatively settled how imminent an anticipated attack must be in order to trigger the 
right to act in self-defence. At one end, it has been suggested that the use of force is permitted to 
‘intercept’ an armed attack to which the other side has committed itself in an irrevocable way, even 
though the first shot has yet to be fired.23 This position is unobjectionable. At the other end, in its 
National Security Strategy issued in 2002, the United States affirmed its readiness to exercise the right 
13 Letter dated 7 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc 
S/2015/688 (8 September 2015).
14 Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc S/2001/947 (7 October 2001). 
15 The Prime Minister (Mr David Cameron), Hansard, House of Commons, 7 September 2015, col 25. 
16 The Prime Minister specifically stated that the intention of the ISIL fighters targeted was ‘the murder of 
British citizens’, ibid. 
17 Nicaragua (n 6), para 195. 
18 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) 
(2004) ICJ Rep 136, para 138. 
19 Sean D Murphy, ‘Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?’ (2005), 
99 American Journal of International Law 62.
20 See Christian J Tams, ‘The Use of Force against Terrorists’, (2009) 20 European Journal of International 
Law 359.
21 As implied by Security Council Resolutions 1368 of 12 September 2001 and 1373 of 28 September 2001, 
adopted in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001.
22 E.g. Michael N Schmitt, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013), at 
64. 
23 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-defence (5th edn, 2011), at 204–205. 
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of self-defence by acting ‘preemptively’ against terrorists.24 Such a broad formulation of the right 
enjoys little support. The UK Government has adopted an intermediate position, declaring that 
‘international law permits the use of force in self-defence against an imminent attack but does not 
authorise the use of force to mount a pre-emptive strike against a threat that is more remote’.25 Contrary 
to what has been suggested by some commentators, the fact that the Raqqa operation was planned for 
some time does not imply that the requirement of imminence could not have been satisfied. On this 
point, the debate has focused almost exclusively on the test set out in the famous Caroline case, which 
demands that the necessity for self-defence must be ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation’.26 This formula suggests that self-defence against an impending 
armed attack is permissible only at a point in time when the attack is just about to materialise. This may 
have been a workable standard in the 19th century, but it is too narrow in the present strategic and 
technological environment. It is now broadly accepted that the requirement of imminence must be 
assessed not solely with reference to temporal criteria, but in the light of broader circumstances, 
including the nature of the threat, the capability of the attacker and the ability of the victim State to 
effectively thwart the attack.27 Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the planning and preparation of 
military operations takes time.28 To insist that action must be ‘instant’ and leave ‘no moment for 
deliberation’ may not only be impractical for operational reasons, but it may not allow those planning 
an operation to discharge their duties under the law of armed conflict to take all necessary precautions 
to avoid incidental loss of civilian life.29 Bearing in mind these considerations, nothing suggests that the 
imminence requirement could not have been satisfied in the present case in the face of what was said to 
be a ‘clear, credible and specific terrorist threat’.30 
8 Third, since nothing indicates that the Syrian authorities were implicated in the impending attack 
planned by ISIL, the question arises whether the Government may invoke the right of self-defence to 
justify the conduct of military operations inside Syria. Even where terrorist and other armed groups 
operate without State support, they invariably do so inside another State. For practical reasons, military 
action against such armed groups therefore inevitably involves intervention into the territory of another 
State. Unless the host State is sufficiently implicated in the illicit activities of the armed group, military 
action in its territory would be contrary to the prohibition of the use of force. In recent years, some 
States, in particular the United States of America, have asserted that the use of force in self-defence is 
permissible in such circumstances where the host State is ‘unable or unwilling’ to effectively address 
the threat posed by the armed group.31 The Prime Minister’s statement reveals that the Government 
relied on this test by implication. According to the Prime Minister, military action in Raqqa was taken 
‘because there was no alternative. In this area, there is no government we can work with.’32 The status 
of the ‘unable or unwilling’ test as a rule of international law remains uncertain. However, this does not 
imply that the test is without legal merit. Not only has it been convincingly traced to the law of 
neutrality,33 but it is also corroborated by the broad level of international support for Operation 
24 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, at 6. 
25 The Attorney-General (Lord Goldsmith), Hansard, House of Lords, 21 April 2004, col 370. 
26 Correspondence between Great Britain and the United States, respecting the Arrest and Imprisonment of Mr 
McLeod, for the Destruction of the Steamboat Caroline, March–April 1841 in (1857) 29 BFSP 1840, at 
1138. 
27 Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ‘The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-
Defence’, (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 963, at 967–968. 
28 As the Government has pointed out in relation to past incidents: UN Doc S/PV.1109, 7 April 1964, para 23 
(‘Defensive measures undertaken by a responsible Government require preparation and the proper approval 
just as much as any other measure.’)
29 Article 57, Additional Protocol I and Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary 
International Humanitarian Law (2005), Rules 15–24.
30 The Prime Minister (n 13), col 26. 
31 Remarks of President Barack Obama, National Defense University, 23 May 2013 
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-obama). 
32 The Prime Minister (n 13), col 25. 
33 Ashley S Deeks, ‘“Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense’ 
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Enduring Freedom in its initial stages after the attacks of 11 September 2001. 
9 As far as the right of collective self-defence is concerned, reliance on this right by the Government 
does not remove the need for the victim State, in this case Iraq, to satisfy the requirements of individual 
self-defence.34 In the present case, Iraq did so with reference to the attacks perpetrated by ISIL against it 
from abroad, in particular from eastern Syria.35 In so far as the use of force against targets in Syria is 
necessary and proportionate in response to the ongoing attacks against Iraq emanating from Syrian 
territory as a matter of Iraq’s right of individual self-defence, the Government is justified to rely on the 
right of collective self-defence. Nonetheless, the fact that the Prime Minister conceded that ‘the strike 
was not part of coalition military action against ISIL in Syria’36 has caused some to query whether the 
Government may consistently invoke both individual and collective self-defence as a legal justification.37 
This inconsistency is more apparent than real. As will be recalled, Parliament did not endorse UK air 
strikes in Syria as part of the campaign to assist the Government of Iraq to defend itself against the 
threat posed by ISIL.38 Since the aim of the Raqqa strike was to defend the UK, the operation did not 
overstep this limitation. However, none of this prevents the Government from invoking the right of 
collective self-defence as an additional ground for establishing the legality of the operation as a matter 
of international law.
10 Overall, the Government has set out a prima facie case for the legality of the drone strike of 21 
August 2015 under the law governing the use of force. Although not all of the legal principles it has 
relied on are settled, it is for the Government to decide, acting in good faith and with due regard to the 
UK’s international obligations and the facts, whether or not on balance a sufficiently strong case exists 
to justify military action. 
IV. The Law of Armed Conflict
11 The law of armed conflict, also known as international humanitarian law, governs the conduct of 
hostilities in times of war. The law falls into two branches. One branch applies in international armed 
conflicts between two or more States, while the other applies in non-international armed conflicts 
between States and non-State actors or between several non-State actors. In both cases, the existence of 
an armed conflict is a precondition for the applicability of the main body of the law. Accordingly, drone 
operations are subject to the law of armed conflict whenever they take place in the context of an 
international or a non-international armed conflict. 
12 Responding to a question by the then Leader of the Opposition following his statement to the 
House of Commons, the Prime Minister accepted that the Raqqa operation was ‘a new departure’ in so 
far as it represented ‘the first time in modern times that a British asset has been used to conduct a strike 
in a country where we are not involved in a war’.39 This factor does complicate the operation’s 
classification under the law of armed conflict. 
13 As the Prime Minister has pointed out, the UK has carried out lethal drone strikes in Afghanistan 
and more recently in Iraq. In those cases, the assets involved were deployed in the context of ongoing 
non-international armed conflicts to which the UK was a party (in the case of Afghanistan)40 or still is a 
party (in the case of Iraq)41 in order to carry out strikes against targets located within the territory of 
(2011–2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 483. 
34 Nicaragua (n 6), para 195. 
35 See Letter dated 25 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2014/440 (25 June 2014) and Letter dated 20 September 2014 from the 
Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
UN Doc S/2014/691 (22 September 2014).
36 The Prime Minister (n 13), col 26. 
37 ‘UK Envoy Makes New Legal Argument for Drone Killings in Syria’, The Guardian, 10 September 2015. 
38 Hansard, House of Commons, 26 September 2014, cols 1365–1366.
39 The Prime Minister (n 13), col 30.
40 GS (Existence of Internal Armed Conflict) Afghanistan [2009] UKAIT 10 (‘The Secretary of State concedes 
that as at 7 January 2009 for the purpose of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) there is an internal armed 
conflict in Afghanistan extending to the whole of the territory of Afghanistan’).
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other parties to those conflicts, Afghanistan and Iraq respectively. Because of these factual 
circumstances, it is beyond doubt that the law of non-international armed conflict applied to the drone 
operations carried out in these theatres. By contrast, the classification of the Syrian operation is not as 
straightforward. Two questions must be distinguished.
14 First, did the law of armed conflict apply between the UK and Syria? The answer depends on 
whether or not an armed conflict arose between the UK and Syria.42 One school of thought holds that 
hostilities between two States must reach a certain degree of intensity before they can be classified as 
armed conflicts and thus trigger the applicability of the law of armed conflict.43 Another school of 
thought suggests that no such intensity requirement applies, but that ‘[a]ny difference arising between 
two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces’ constitutes an international 
armed conflict’.44 While the Raqqa strike involved a military intervention by British forces into Syrian 
territory without the consent of the Syrian authorities, it was not directed against the assets or personnel 
of the Syrian State. Accordingly, irrespective of whether the strike satisfied any applicable intensity 
requirements, the applicability of the law of armed conflict between the UK and Syria may be 
questioned on the grounds that the hostilities did not in fact arise between two States, but between the 
UK and ISIL. An alternative position suggests that the conduct of hostilities by one State against non-
State actors located in the territory of another State without the latter’s consent nonetheless amounts to 
‘resort to armed force between two States’,45 leading to the applicability of the law of non-international 
armed conflict. However, even if this position is correct and the law of international armed conflict did 
apply between the UK and Syria, this would be of limited practical import in the present case, since no 
combat activities actually ensued between British and Syrian forces.
15 Second, did the law of armed conflict apply between the UK and the ISIL fighters targeted in the 
strike? Three main possibilities must be considered. First, according to one view, in circumstances 
where one State conducts military operations against non-State actors inside the territory of another 
State without its consent, the conflict between the intervening and the territorial State and the conflict 
between the intervening State and the non-State actor are to be classified as a single international armed 
conflict.46 On this account, the Raqqa strike was governed by the law of international armed conflict. 
However, this approach is not convincing, because it is based on the idea that the hostilities between the 
two States and between the intervening State and the non-State actor are inseparable.47 This may be true 
in some situations, but it is certainly not true in the present case, where ISIL is involved in an armed 
conflict against Syria. The hostilities between the UK and ISIL and between the UK and Syria are 
therefore clearly separate in nature. Consequently, the possibility that the strike was governed by the 
law of international armed conflict must be discounted.
16 Second, since the UK is a party to an ongoing non-international armed conflict with ISIL in the 
territory of Iraq,48 it is conceivable that the law governing this conflict extended to British operations in 
Syria. While it is common ground that the law of armed conflict applies in the territory of a State party 
to a non-international armed conflict,49 it is less certain under what conditions it may apply beyond its 
borders. One approach, supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross,50 suggests that the 
41 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights 
Situation in Iraq in the Light of Abuses Committed by the So-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and 
Associated Groups, UN Doc A/HRC/28/18, 13 March 2015, para 13.
42 Common Article 2, Geneva Conventions of 1949.
43 International Law Association, Use of Force Committee, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in 
International Law, at 29–32.
44 Jean Pictet (ed.) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: 
Commentary (Volume IV) (1958), at 20.
45 The Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para 70.
46 Dapo Akande, ‘Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts’, in Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed), 
International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (2012) 32, 70–79.
47 Ibid, at 77.
48 See n 38.
49 Tadić (n 36), paras 69–70.
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law may extend to ‘spill-over’ conflicts, in other words to situations where an existing non-international 
armed conflict between government forces and rebel groups spills over into the territory of a 
neighbouring State.51 To the extent that the Raqqa strike was carried out in support of the Iraqi 
authorities in their fight against ISIL, a strong case can be made that it was covered by the law 
applicable to that conflict. A second approach focuses on the parties to the conflict, rather than the 
geographical reach of the active battlefield. It suggests that once applicable, the law of armed conflict 
regulates the relationship between the parties to the conflict irrespective of their geographical location.52 
This is so because the status of a combatant, fighter or civilian does not change depending on his or her 
location. Consequently, if the persons targeted in the Raqqa strike were to be regarded as ISIL fighters 
and legitimate targets under the law of armed conflict when located in Iraq, they must be regarded as 
ISIL fighters and legitimate targets when present in Syria. Indeed, any other conclusion would lead to 
the absurd situation that ISIL fighters located in Syria constitute legitimate military objectives for the 
United States and other coalition members engaged in the non-international armed conflict against ISIL 
across Iraq and Syria, but not for the UK, despite being a member of that coalition and a party to that 
same non-international armed conflict. Consequently, both the spillover and the status-based approach 
lead to the conclusion that the Raqqa strike was covered by the law of non-international armed conflict. 
This conclusion also implies that the strike did not represent quite such a novel departure as has been 
suggested. What is novel about the Raqqa strike is the fact that it involved the deployment of British 
aerial assets in the territory of a State in which the UK does not also deploy ground troops. However, 
the more important factor is that the strike was carried out against individuals who belong to an 
opposing party in a non-international armed conflict to which the UK was already a party. 
17 Third, at first sight, the Prime Minister’s statement that ‘the strike was not part of coalition 
military action against ISIL in Syria’53 appears to undermine the conclusions reached in the preceding 
paragraph. The statement may be understood to suggest that the Government does not consider the 
Raqqa strike to be part of an existing non-international armed conflict between the UK and ISIL. This 
could mean one of two things. First, it could imply that the Government takes the view that no armed 
conflict pertained between the UK and ISIL in Syria and that the law of armed conflict therefore was 
not applicable to the Raqqa operation at all. However, this not only seems counter-intuitive, but also 
overlooks the fact that in describing the legal aspects of the operation, the Prime Minister clearly did 
invoke the law of armed conflict.54 Second, it could imply that the Government considers the Raqqa 
strike to have triggered a new and separate non-international armed conflict just between the UK and 
ISIL. It is generally accepted that a non-international armed conflict under Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 comes into existence provided that the parties display a certain level of 
organisation and that the hostilities between them reach a certain level of intensity.55 While ISIL is an 
organised armed group which clearly meets the requirement of organisation, a single drone strike killing 
three individuals and destroying a vehicle does not satisfy the requisite degree of intensity to cross the 
threshold of a non-international armed conflict.56 Ultimately, however, these considerations are 
misplaced. The thrust of the Prime Minister’s statement is to underline that the UK undertook the Raqqa 
strike unilaterally, rather than as part of coalition action in Syria. This does not place the operation 
outside the context of the non-international armed conflict between the coalition and ISIL. Despite its 
unilateral nature, the strike clearly benefitted Iraq and its coalition partners in their fight against ISIL by 
weakening the latter. Moreover, although the relevant details have not been released, it is safe to 
50 See ICRC, Report on International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed 
Conflicts, Presented to the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 
October 2015, at 15.
51 Michael N Schmitt, ‘Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International Armed Conflict’, (2014) 90 
International Law Studies 1, 11–12; Pejic (n 4), 80–81.
52 Schmitt (n 43), 12–18; Pejic (n 4), 102.
53 The Prime Minister (n 13), col 26. 
54 In particular, he referred to the principles of proportionality and military necessity, to targeting and the need 
to minimise the risk of civilian causalities: The Prime Minister (n 13), col 26.
55 The Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Case No IT-04-82, Judgment, ICTY Trial 
Chamber, 10 July 2008, para 175.
56 Nor would a single strike satisfy the requirement for ‘protracted’ violence. See Dinstein (n 19), 32-34.
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presume that the strike was carried with the support of British assets and personnel already engaged in 
the conflict against ISIL. Given this close nexus to the broader non-international armed conflict,57 the 
Raqqa strike is properly characterised as a spillover operation or simply as part of the non-international 
armed conflict spanning Iraq and Syria, despite its unilateral character. Accordingly, the Prime 
Minister’s statement that the operation was not part of coalition military action in Syria does not 
weaken the conclusion reached earlier that the law of non-international armed conflict applied to the 
strike. 
18 The law of non-international armed conflict permits the lethal targeting of members of organised 
armed groups and civilians directly participating in hostilities.58 Whereas members of organised armed 
groups may be targeted at all times, provided they are not hors de combat,59 civilians lose their 
immunity from direct attack only for such time as they directly participate in hostilities. The Prime 
Minister described the three individuals killed in the strike as ISIL fighters, adding that there were no 
civilian casualties. This suggests that the Government considered all three men to be members of an 
organised armed group and therefore subject to lethal targeting based on their status. The publicly 
available information about the intended target of the strike, Reyaad Khan, and the second British 
national killed, Ruhul Amin, suggests that both carried out a continuous combat function within the 
meaning of the International Committee of the Red Cross’ Interpretative Guidance on Direct 
Participation in Hostilities.60 Accordingly, both men were legitimate military objectives. No 
information has been revealed about the third individual killed in the strike. There are no reasons to 
doubt the Prime Minister’s statement that this individual was not a civilian either. However, it is worth 
noting that even if it were established that the third individual was not an ISIL fighter or a civilian 
directly participating in the hostilities, in the present case the loss of civilian life would not have 
exceeded the military advantage anticipated from the strike.61 Accordingly, it is safe to conclude that 
the Raqqa strike was conducted in full compliance with the law of armed conflict. 
V. International Human Rights Law
19 The UK is subject to an extensive set of human rights obligations, both in its capacity as a party to 
key international human rights instruments and under customary international law. Today, it is well-
established that international human rights instruments continue to apply in times of armed conflict and 
that they may also apply outside the national territory of their signatories.62 Consequently, the UK’s 
human rights obligations may be applicable to overseas military deployments, including drone 
operations carried out by British forces. However, the applicability of international human rights law to 
extra-territorial military deployments is a matter of considerable controversy. In the UK, this 
controversy has focused primarily on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Three 
questions in particular have generated debate: the circumstances in which the Convention is applicable 
in an extra-territorial manner, the extent to which it applies in these circumstances and its relationship 
with the rules of the law of armed conflict. We will address these questions in turn.
20 The key concept establishing the applicability of the ECHR in pursuance of Article 1 ECHR is not 
‘territory’, but ‘jurisdiction’.63 Whilst the concept is intrinsically linked to territory, it is not restricted to 
the territory of the Contracting Parties. Indeed, although the Court seemed to indicate in Bankovic that 
the Convention could not apply outside the espace juridique of the Contracting Parties,64 it has accepted 
57 See Noam Lubell and Nathan Derejko, ‘A Global Battlefield?: Drones and the Geographical Scope of 
Armed Conflict’ (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice 65, 77.
58 Pejic (n 4), 88–92.
59 Article 41, Additional Protocol I.
60 ICRC, Interpretative Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities (2009), 33–34.
61 As required under Article 57(2)(a)(ii), Additional Protocol I.
62 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 266, para 25; Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion [2004] 
ICJ Rep 136, paras 101–106; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep, para 261; Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24, 20 May 2010, para 43.
63 Bankovic et al v Belgium et al., Application No 52207/99, 12 December 2001, para 73.
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its application abroad, beyond the borders of Europe.65 However, extra-territorial jurisdiction remains 
exceptional.66 Underpinning the extraterritorial application of the ECHR is the issue of whether the 
State is exercising ‘authority’ or ‘effective control’. With regard to military operations conducted 
abroad, this exercise of authority or effective control can be divided into three models of application: 
(1) personal control, (2) area or spatial control and (3) ‘assumption of authority’ combined with a 
jurisdictional link. In the case of Al-Skeini,67 the Court offered a principled summary of its case-law on 
extra-territorial jurisdiction and explicitly recognised the two former models. However, in Al-Skeini and 
subsequent cases,68 the Court actually applied a third model, an ‘assumption of authority’ (stressing the 
exercise of public powers69) combined with a jurisdictional link test.70 It is so far unclear whether this 
model spells out a new test or whether it is a way for the Court to combine the first two models, when 
the State is not in full control of either the person or the territory. Indeed, neither the ‘assumption of 
authority’ nor the jurisdictional link element of the test amounts to effective control and thus neither of 
them would cross the jurisdictional threshold independently. 
21 The personal control test relates to the State authority over an individual: ‘[w]hat is decisive […] is 
the exercise of physical power and control over the person in question’.71 It is not immediately clear 
whether a person targeted in a lethal drone strike would fall within the ‘physical power and control’ of 
the State conducting the operation, thereby satisfying the personal control test. This question may be 
answered from two perspectives: a principled approach and with reference to the existing case-law. 
First, if ‘power’ is understood to involve the application of coercive force, then the conduct of lethal 
strikes by airborne weapons system clearly amounts to an exercise of power. However, it is 
questionable whether such strikes also amount to an exercise of ‘control’, as required by the test. This is 
so because a relationship of control implies some form of mutual interaction between the State and the 
person or entity it controls. Not only must the State assume control by issuing instructions or express its 
will through other means, but the controlled person or entity most receive those instructions and act 
upon them.72 It is not the purpose or effect of lethal drone strikes to establish such a relationship. 
Indeed, since the individuals targeted by drone operations are mostly unaware of the fact that they are 
being targeted, there is no mutual interaction between them and the drone operating State at all. 
Consequently, as a matter of fact, lethal drone operations do not entail the exercise of control over their 
intended target and it is questionable whether they are actually capable of doing so. Second, the 
paradigmatic example of the personal authority and control test under the ECHR is the arrest and/or 
detention of individuals by agents of the State.73 Arrest and detention involves direct and close 
interaction between the detainee and the agents of the State. By contrast, lethal drone operations lack 
that element of direct interaction and proximity. In fact, the most relevant precedent in the present 
context is the case of Bankovic, where the Court accepted that the conduct of air strikes by manned 
aircraft does not bring the individuals targeted or affected within the jurisdiction of the State concerned. 
64 Bankovic (n 63), para 80.
65 Application in Iran: Mansur Pad and others v Turkey, Application No 60167/00, 28 June 2007; Application 
in Iraq: Al Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, Application No 61498/08, 2 March 2010; Al-Skeini and others v 
UK, Application No 55721/077, 7 July 2011; Al Jedda v UK, Application No 27021/08, 7 July 2011; Hassan 
v UK, Application No 29750/09, 16 September 2014; Jaloud v the Netherlands, Application No 47708/08, 
20 November 2014.
66 Bankovic (n 63), para 71; Al-Skeini (n 65), para 131; Jaloud (n 65), para 139 (reiterating Al Skeini).
67 Al-Skeini (n 65), paras 149–150.
68 Hassan (n 65), para 75; Jaloud (n 65), para 149–152.
69 Al-Skeini (n 65), para 149 (‘public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government’).
70 See Marko Milanović, ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International 
Law 131 and, in greater detail, Aurel Sari, ‘Untangling Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction from International 
Responsibility in Jaloud v. Netherlands: Old Problem, New Solutions?’ (2014) 53 Military Law and the Law 
of War Review 287.
71 Al-Skeini (n 65) para 136.
72 Cf Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), (Judgment) (2007) ICJ Rep 15, para 400.
73 Eg Al Saadoon (n 65); Al-Skeini (n 65); Al Jedda (n 65).
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The same principle must also apply to strikes carried out by unmanned aerial weapons systems. 
Although in a small number of subsequent cases the Court has accepted that close-range shooting 
incidents may amount to an exercise of jurisdiction for the purposes of the ECHR,74 these cases 
involved ground operations in territory to which the Convention was already applicable or in an area 
controlled by the forces conducting the operation. These features clearly distinguish these cases from 
Bankovic and from aerial operations generally. Further, it must be recalled that the Court has 
consistently held that the ECHR does not admit of cause-and-effect jurisdiction, meaning that causing 
harm to individual, absent an exercise of power and control, is insufficient to trigger its applicability.75 
For these reasons, lethal drone operations on their own do not amount to an exercise of control and thus 
do not engage the applicability of the ECHR.
22 Pursuant to the spatial control test, the State has to exercise effective control over an area or 
foreign territory. The significance of this test is that if a State is found to be in effective control of 
foreign territory, individuals present within that territory fall within its jurisdiction even in the absence 
of direct contact between those individuals and the agents of the State.76 Such a situation usually arises 
when a State is occupying or administering a territory, directly or via a third party such as a local 
administration.77 If drone attacks were to be carried out on a territory occupied or administered by the 
UK, then such attacks would fall within the purview of the ECHR. Likewise, if the UK were to 
administer foreign territory via a third party and this third party were to conduct drone attacks, the UK 
may be held responsible for such attacks. In recent cases, the Court has widened its understanding of 
effective control over territory by accepting that influence by and dependence on another State as 
evidence of jurisdiction.78 Based on this more relaxed standard, the UK could be held in violation of the 
ECHR if drone attacks were carried out by a State which depends on the UK or whose decisions the UK 
can influence. It is worth recalling, however, that the Court has never found the UK to be exercising 
effective control under the spatial control test in Iraq.79 Drone attacks currently carried out by the UK in 
Iraq do not fall within the purview of the ECHR under this test. 
23 The Court seems to be moving away from the high threshold of the ‘effective control’ terminology 
under the spatial and personal control tests and to prefer using a combination of ‘assumed authority’ 
threshold combined with a personal/jurisdictional link.80 The Court has so far dealt with two examples 
of situations of ‘assumption of authority’ or ‘assumption of exercise of public powers’. In the first one, 
such authority was based of the law of belligerent occupation;81 in the second, it was based on a United 
Nations Security Council Chapter VII mandate.82 Even if the ‘assumption of authority’ threshold is 
crossed, a jurisdictional link needs to be established. Based on this line of cases, provided that the UK 
has assumed authority for the exercise of public powers over the area of operations either as a matter of 
the law of belligerent occupation or a Chapter VII mandate, and British forces use lethal forces against 
an individual within that area, this may suffice to trigger the applicability of the European Convention, 
irrespective of whether or not the UK exercised effective control over the territory or over the 
74 See eg Issa and Others v Turkey, Application No 31821/96, 16 November 2004; Andreou Papi v Turkey, 
Application No 16094/90, 22 September 2009.
75 Bankovic (n 63), para 75; Medvedyev and others v France, Application No 3394/03, 29 March 2010, para 
64.
76 Cyprus v Turkey, Application No 25781/94, 10 May 2001, para 77; Catan et al v Moldova and 
Russia, Applications No 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18545/06, 19 October 2012, para 149.
77 See eg Loizidou v Turkey (merits), Application No 15318/89, 18 December 1996, para 52; Cyprus v Turkey 
(n 76), para 77; Loizidou v Turkey, Application No 15318/89, 23 March 1995; Ilascu et al v Moldova and 
Russia, Application No 48787/99, 8 July 2004; Catan (n 76).
78 Ilascu (n 77), paras 192–193; Catan (n 76), paras 120–121.
79 In Al Skeini, the Court did not discuss whether the UK exercised effective (military) control although it was 
an occupying force (Al-Skeini (n 65)). Later, in Hassan, it explained that the evidence ‘tended to 
demonstrate that the United Kingdom was far from being in effective control of the south-eastern area which 
it occupied’ (para 5) and thus the Court ‘invented’ a new test based on assumed authority (Hassan (n 65)).
80 Jaloud (n 65), paras 149–150 and 152. 
81 Al-Skeini (n 65), paras 146 and 148. 
82 Jaloud (n 65), paras 144–148.
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individual in question. However, the Court’s jurisprudence in this area has so far only established the 
necessary jurisdictional link in situations where ground troops have been involved and where the troops 
acted in close proximity to the targeted individual.83 Bearing in mind the continued relevance of 
Bankovic, it is not clear whether lethal drone strikes do actually fall within the scope of the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the ‘assumption of authority’ text. What can be stated with reasonable certainty is that 
drone attacks will be subject to the ECHR if they are carried out in a territory which is under the 
effective control of the UK, ie that the UK is occupying or administering, directly or via a third party.. 
This was not the case in the operation in Raqqa. Nor did the UK assume authority over the area of 
operations under the law of belligerent occupation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Accordingly, the 
ECHR did not apply to the drone strike in Raqqa under this model of jurisdiction. 
24 Even if jurisdiction is established and the ECHR were to apply, the question arises as to which of 
its provisions are applicable. In its more recent case-law, the Court has accepted that the Convention 
can be divided and tailored depending on the circumstances of the extraterritorial act.84 Where the 
ECHR is applicable, lethal drone attacks clearly engage the right to life under Article 2 ECHR.85 
Whether and to what extent other provisions of the Convention are engaged is less certain.86 This 
submission will therefore focus on the substantive and procedural aspects of Article 2 ECHR as the UK 
would need to comply with both aspects.87
25 The UK must prove that pursuant to Article 2(1) ECHR there is a legal framework to safeguard the 
lives of those within its jurisdiction and that the deprivation of life is ‘absolutely necessary’,88 ie 
proportionate to the achievement of one of the aims listed in Article 2(2) ECHR89 and indispensable. 
Article 2(1) ECHR requires States to set up an appropriate legal and administrative framework 
regulating the use of force.90 Whilst a vague and general domestic legal framework constitutes a 
violation of Article 2(1) ECHR,91 regulations ‘setting out exhaustive lists of situations in which [state 
agents] could make use of firearms [are] compatible with the Convention.’92 Applied to drone strikes, 
this would require the UK to adopt a legal framework laying down the criteria for lethal targeting and 
the procedures for authorising such strikes. This would be in line with requests by international bodies 
83 Al-Skeini (n 65), para 150 (‘British soldiers carried out a patrol in the vicinity of the applicant’s home’); 
Jaloud (n 65), para 152 (‘asserting authority and control over persons passing through the checkpoint.’)
84 Al-Skeini (n 65), para 137. See a contrario Bankovic (n 63), para 75.
85 Isayeva v Russia, Application No 57950/00, 24 February 2005, para 175; Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v 
Russia, Applications Nos 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00, 24 February 2005, para 171.
86 It is conceivable that Article 3 be also triggered. In Makaratzis as the Court found a violation of Article 2 
ECHR no separate issue arose under Article 3. Makaratzis v Greece, Application No 50385/99, 20 
December 2004, para 83. In Bulut the Court examined an Article 3 ECHR complaint following the use of 
force by police forces against an individual. Necdet Bulut v Turkey, Application No 77092/01, 20 November 
2007.
87 In the context of military operations carried out by Russia in Chechnya the Court clearly explained that as 
‘[no martial law and no state of emergency has been declared in Chechnya, and no derogation has been 
made under Article 15 of the Convention […] the operation in question therefore has to be judged against a 
normal legal background’. Isayeva (n 85), para 191.
88 See McCann and others v UK, Application No 18984/91, 27 September 1995, para 149; Aksoy v Turkey, 
Application No 21987/93, 18 December 1996, para 148; Isayeva (n 85), para 173.
89 McCann (n 88), paras 146–148.
90 Makaratzis (n 86), paras 56–59 (‘policing operations must be sufficiently regulated by [national law], within 
the framework of a system of adequate and effective safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse of force’) 
para 58. Nachova and others v Bulgaria, Applications Nos 43577/98 and 43579/98, 6 July 2005, paras 93 
and 99–100. See also Giuliani and Gaggio v Italy, Application No 23458/02, 24 March 2011, paras 209–210 
reviewing the Court’s case-law. It may mutadis mutandis be argued that administrative practice alone is not 
sufficient and that precise statutory provisions or case-law is required. Hilda Hafstensdóttir v Iceland, 
Application No 40905/98, 8 June 2004, para 46
91 McCann (n 88), para 151.
92 Bakan v Turkey, Application No 50939/99, 12 June 2007, para 51.
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on the European93 and international level.94 In the context of drone attacks, Article 2(2)(a) ECHR, ie ‘in 
defence of any person from unlawful violence’, is the most likely justification for depriving an 
individual of his/her life95 as it allows for neutralising the threat posed by the ‘targeted’ individual to 
other individuals. The Court has found deprivation of life lawful when it was the honest belief at the 
time of the killing that the individual posed such a threat.96 The bulk of cases before the Court relates to 
situations where there was a direct and imminent threat to the lives of those at the scene,97 seemingly 
requiring an element of proximity as the action is otherwise not ‘absolutely necessary’. However, in the 
context of military operations the Court has accepted in Isayeva et al that an attack or risk of attack by 
‘illegal insurgents’ can fall within the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) if the air strike is a legitimate response 
to the attack.98 The lack of discussion on the imminence of the attack may however be due to the 
particular circumstances of the Isayeva et al case. It is thus possible that the Court would accept that the 
drone attacks are legitimate since they are in defence of a multitude of persons from unlawful violence 
though it is unclear whether the Court would view a pre-emptive strike as lawful. Further, Article 2 
ECHR obliges the UK ‘to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction’,99 
in particular if it ‘knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk 
to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party’.100 This 
means that the UK could argue that it was reasonably expected to take measures (ie drone attack against 
an individual) to avert the risk it was aware of (ie risk to lives of individuals in the UK). 
26 Where deliberate lethal force is used, the Court will not only examine the actions of the State 
agents, but also the surrounding circumstances and in particular the planning and control of the 
operation,101 above all ‘whether the operation was regulated and organised in such a way as to minimise 
to the greatest extent possible any risk to his life’.102 In particular, the Court will assess whether there 
was a possibility to arrest the individual.103 In McCann, the Court also examined the kind of training 
given to the military forces in a law enforcement context104 and, in Makaratzis, stressed the need for a 
clear chain of command.105 Additionally, when an aircrew uses ‘targeted’ lethal force upon orders from 
its commanders, the Court requires that these commanders gather enough information so as to make an 
informed decision before authorising the strike.106 This means that the UK would need to demonstrate 
that it has inter alia verified the identity of the target and established the presence of civilians in the 
vicinity. If the UK follows such a procedure, it is unlikely to breach its substantive duties under Article 
2 ECHR. 
27 Additionally the UK must comply with the procedural aspects of Article 2 ECHR, notably the 
obligation to investigate the attack resulting in the death of an individual.107 The Court has stressed that 
93 See also Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 2021(2015), 23 April 2015, paras 8.2 
and 8.5. 
94 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, UN 
Doc A/68/382, 13 September 2013, para 98.
95 See also PACE Resolution 2021(2015) (n 93), para 6.4.
96 Makaratzis (n 86), para 66; McCann (n 88), para 200; Andronicou and Constantinou v Cyprus, Application 
No 86/1996/705/897, 9 October 1997, para 185.
97 Makaratzis (n 86), para 66; McCann (n 88), para 200.
98 Isayeva et al (n 85), para 181.
99 Osman v UK, Application No 87/1997/871/1083, 28 October 1998, para 115.
100 ibid, para 116.
101 McCann (n 88), paras 146–150; Khatsiyeva and others v Russia, Application No 5108/02, 17 January 2008, 
para 129.
102 Makaratzis (n 86), para 60. See also Isayeva (n 85), para 174.
103 McCann (n 88), para 213; Makaratzis (n 86), para 64. See also PACE Resolution 2021(2015) (n 93), para 
6.3.
104 McCann (n 88), paras 211–212.
105 Makaratzis (n 86), para 68.
106 Khatsiyeva (n 101), para 136.
107 McKerr v the United Kingdom, Application No 28883/95, 4 May 2001, para 111. On the general obligation 
to investigate, see also European Parliament, Resolution 2014/2567(RSP), 25 February 2014, para C; PACE 
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this obligation also applies ‘in difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed conflict’108 
though some leeway is granted.109 As Heyns, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, notes, ‘the human rights law obligation to investigate violations of 
the right to life continues to apply during armed conflict albeit interpreted, during the conduct of 
hostilities, with reference to the complementary principles of international humanitarian law.’110 The 
investigation must be effective, ie able to determine whether the force used was or not justified in the 
circumstances, and if not, to identify and punish those responsible,111 prompt112 and independent.113 
More specifically, it involves an obligation to ‘secure the evidence concerning the incident, 
including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which 
provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of clinical findings, 
including the cause of death’.114 This is a duty of means, not of result.115 It should not be impossible to 
comply with these procedural requirements in circumstances where the UK exercises effective control 
over the area or territory in which it carried out a drone strike. However, it is difficult to see how the 
UK could comply with these obligations if its jurisdiction was based on the ‘assumption of authority’ 
and jurisdictional link test, since this model implies the absence of effective control over the territory 
and person targeted. 
28 Should the ECHR be found applicable to drone operations, in principle the UK may rely on Article 
15 ECHR in order to derogate from its obligations under the Convention to the extent ‘strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation’.116 In this respect, it should be recalled that Article 15(2) specifically 
allows derogations for ‘deaths resulting from lawful acts of war’. Even in cases where no derogation 
was is made, the Court has accepted the need to accommodate the rules of the law of armed conflict.117 
In the Hassan case, the Court clearly stated that ‘the safeguards under the Convention continue to 
apply, albeit interpreted against the background of the provisions of international humanitarian law.’118 
In other words, the Court accepted that it must take into account the law of armed conflict when 
interpreting and applying Article 5 ECHR.119 Even though Hassan pertains to Article 5 ECHR, the 
same principle also extends to Article 2, all the more as the Court relied on Varnava,120 an Article 2 
Resolution 2021(2015) (n 93), paras 6.4 and 8.4.
108 Al-Skeini (n 65), para 164 as reiterated in Jaloud (n 65), para 186; Ergi v Turkey, Application No 
66/1997/850/1057, 28 July 1998, para 85.
109 Al-Skeini (n 65), para 165 as reiterated in Jaloud (n 65), para 186. See also Jaloud (n65), para 226.
110 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, UN 
Doc A/70/304, 7 August 2015, para 28.
111 Hugh Jordan v UK, Application No 24746/94, 4 May 2001, para 128; Al-Skeini (n 65), para 166; Jaloud (n 
65), para 200.
112 Makaratzis (n 86), para 74.
113 The requirement of independence is mentioned in several cases including Al-Skeini (n 65), para 167.
114 Al-Skeini (n 65), para 166.
115 Makaratzis (n 86), para 74; Al-Skeini (n 65), para 166.
116 Due to space constraints we are not elaborating on the conditions for the applicability of the derogations 
under Article 15 ECHR and on whether such a claim would be successful in an extraterritorial context. 
Suffice is to say that the extra-territorial applicability of Article 15 ECHR is not settled. See Written 
Evidence from Dr Aurel Sari to the House of Commons Defence Committee, November 2013 
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/931/931we13.htm). 
117 The way the Court has accepted to introduce the law of armed conflict into the Convention virtually amounts 
to an application of the lex specialis doctrine. For a discussion on this doctrine, see eg William A Schabas, 
‘Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed 
Conflict and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum’ (2007) 40 Israel Law Review 592-613; Juliet Chevalier-
Watts, ‘Has Human Rights Law Become Lex Specialis for the European Court of Human Rights in Right to 
Life Cases Arising from Internal Armed Conflicts?’ (2010) 14(4) International Journal of Human Rights 
584-602.
118 Hassan (n 65), para 104. 
119 Hassan (n 65), para 103.
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ECHR case, to justify its interpretative approach in Hassan. A more difficult question is whether and to 
what extent the principle of accommodation is available in non-international armed conflicts. In 
Hassan, the Court expressly limited the principle to international armed conflicts, given that the legal 
basis for interment in a non-international armed conflict is contested.121 A similar problem arises in 
relation to lethal targeting, since the legal authority to engage in such operations is well-established in 
the context of international armed conflicts, but less so in the setting of a non-international armed 
conflicts. However, practice suggests that States regard themselves entitled in non-international armed 
conflicts of a transnational character to target civilians taking a direct part in the hostilities on the basis 
of the military contribution they make to the adversary and to target and members of organised armed 
groups based on the basis of their membership in the organisation alone, rather than on any immediate 
threat to life these individuals may present.122 This strongly suggests that the authority to conduct such 
operations in a non-international armed conflict must be accommodated with Article 2 ECHR. 
Consequently, even in circumstances where the ECHR applies and no derogations have been adopted, 
the law of armed conflict may authorise the UK to conduct lethal drone operations beyond the confines 
of the ECHR in a non-international armed conflict.
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